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Abstract
This paper constructs an equilibrium model of entrepreneurial innovation where indi-
viduals di®er in their attitude toward uncertainty. Unlike previous models of innovation,
the ¯rm-formation process is endogenous. An entrepreneur, who owns residual pro¯ts, uti-
lizes an uncertain technology and hires a worker who may only be partially isolated from
uncertainty. While the available production technologies are exogenously speci¯ed, the tech-
nologies that operate in equilibrium are endogenous, depending on both the entrepreneur's
prior beliefs about the pro¯tability of the technology, as well as the worker's willingness to
work with the uncertain technology. The general equilibrium setting allows us to explore
the impact of innovation on the nature of the ¯rm. The relationship between technological
uncertainty and the nature of the ¯rm is able to explain the commonly observed S-shaped
di®usion pro¯le. As uncertainty falls, ¯rms evolve from being entrepreneurial to corporate,
¯nally becoming bureaucratic.
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With a burgeoning dot-com entrepreneurial class fuelling technological expansion, growth and
dizzying market cycles, innovative entrepreneurship has captured the interest of policy-makers.
Tales { apocryphal and otherwise { of entrepreneurs such as Microsoft's Bill Gates and Apple's
Steve Jobs, who launched new ¯rms in untried and uncertain industries, spur others to seek
their own fortunes through entrepreneurial innovation. Behind these start-ups is a visionary
entrepreneur, who abandons his safe job and stakes all on the success of the °edgling enterprise.
Such innovations are poorly captured in the economics literature, which has tended to consider a
more cautious type of innovation, where existing ¯rms enter new, but closely related, markets.
Concepts such as \leadership" and the \entrepreneurial vision" of individuals { which are
central to the management literature on innovation { are largely absent from these economic
models, despite the signi¯cant impact that a handful of individuals have had in shaping the
new technology of developed economies.1
The present paper has two objectives. The ¯rst is to construct an equilibrium model of
innovation and ¯rm formation in the presence of uncertainty, and propose a new equilibrium
concept which is suitable for studying commodity innovation. Although the economy is a
stripped-down a®air, with an emphasis on the labor markets, it o®ers a simple and °exible
model of entrepreneurial innovation and di®usion where agents di®er in their attitude to un-
certainty.
The second objective is to integrate the literature on the entrepreneurial ¯rm with that on
the di®usion of innovations; re-establishing the entrepreneur as central to understanding the
process of ¯rm formation and innovation. We show that innovation proof equilibria, can aid us
in understanding real-world phenomena such as the S-shaped di®usion curve.
By innovation, we mean the implementation of a new productive technology: either a new
method of production for an existing product, or the production of an entirely new product.
Standard models in the Arrow-Debreu spirit, exogenously specify the commodities that will be
marketed, therefore precluding the role of an entrepreneur as an innovator.
Innovative enterprises will typically exhibit highly uncertain pro¯tability, in the Knightian
(1921) sense. Therefore, the attitude of agents to situations where outcomes are governed by
stochastic processes without objective probabilities is central to understanding the motivation
for innovation. As Schumpeter (1947, p.152) argues:
\It is in most cases only one man or a few men who see the new possibility and
are able to cope with the resistance and di±culties which action always meets with
outside the rut of established practice."
In the Bayesian world of subjective expected utility (SEU), agents arbitrarily choose a single
distribution from those consistent with the available information, reducing objective uncertainty
to subjective risk. However, decision-makers might instead prefer to adopt an holistic view of
the set of possible distributions, and incorporate all of them into the decision-making process
1Of course, it did not take the recent NASDAQ gymnastics to make economists aware of the problem: Baumol
(1968) made a similar lament some 30 years ago. However, economists have been extremely slow to respond, so
the criticism has lost little of its force over the intervening decades.
12. In our framework, agents follow the latter approach. They utilize either the upper or lower
envelope of the set of distributions to guide their decisions.3 We designate the former type
Bulls, and their more timid counterparts bears.
This deviation from Bayesianism is undertaken for several reasons. First, evidence against
the descriptive realism of SEU is now legion.4 Second, the framework of Dempster (1967) allows
the uncertainty of a process to be speci¯ed using exogenous \parameters". This facilitates com-
parative statics exercises. We can vary the degree of uncertainty surrounding a new technology
to examine its e®ects on equilibrium. Since the process of innovation di®usion inevitably leads
to uncertainty reductions, this feature of the model is extremely useful for studying di®usion.
Finally, our model of behavior allows us to de¯ne \optimism" and \pessimism" in the face of
uncertainty in a consistent way. A Bull, for example, is optimistic in a consistent fashion about
the outcome of any uncertain process in any market of any economy. An SEU decision-maker's
degree of \optimism" must be separately speci¯ed with respect to every distinct uncertain
process. Thus, we can study an in¯nite range of di®erent economies using only our two types
of agent { Bulls and bears { which greatly simpli¯es the analysis.
In our model, the uncertainty attitude of the individual is central to innovation. There
are a continuum of agents, a fraction ® of whom are Bulls, and a ¯nite number of production
technologies, summarized by reduced-form stochastic revenue functions. However, there is no
exogenous speci¯cation of ¯rms. Any agent may choose to start a ¯rm using any of the available
technologies. Each ¯rm employs a single worker. Employer liability is limited, however, so
wages may not be fully paid in all states. Each technology has its own labor market, since the
wage default contingencies may vary across two ¯rms o®ering the same wage but using di®erent
technologies. Agents choose which labor market to participate in, and which side to take.
The inclusion of entrepreneurship and ¯rm formation into a standard GE framework pro-
vides a particular challenge. All agents are assumed to be price takers in those markets with
a non-zero density of participants, and wages must clear all markets simultaneously. However,
in addition, the equilibrium must be innovation-proof. Since the singular role of the innovative
entrepreneur is to establish a new (labor) market, it is meaningless to speak of an equilibrium
wage rate for that market, which the entrepreneur takes as given. Instead, the entrepreneur
must assess for herself the wage o®ers that are su±cient to attract a worker from his current job
into the new enterprise. Therefore, an equilibrium is innovation-proof if it is not possible for
an entrepreneur to start a ¯rm with a new (currently unused) technology, pay a wage adequate
to attract a worker, and generate an expected return that improves upon her own equilibrium
utility. Hence, in equilibrium, all pro¯table entrepreneurial opportunities have been exploited.
Therefore, innovation requires the existence of an entrepreneur and a worker who are willing
to share the uncertainties of the new enterprise in a manner which improves on the next-best
occupational options of both. Indeed, the existence of a new technology, even if not taken up,
can in°uence wages in other industries, as existing labor markets absorb the pressure presented
by the new entrepreneurial option now available to all agents. This phenomena is in fact
observed in the dot-com sector, where there is pressure on employers to retain sta® by paying
higher salaries and matching the working conditions of start-ups, such as casual dress codes and
2Compare with the methodology of robust Bayesian inference discussed in Huber (1981)
3See Dempster (1967).
4See Camerer (1995) for a survey.
2greater work °exibility. As one journal notes \with barriers to entry crumbling, easier access
to capital for start-ups and support networks for new businesses in place, savvy employees
have never been so empowered".5 In other words, the existence of new technology improves
the outside options of workers in an established industry. The notion of an \innovation-proof
entrepreneurial equilibrium", presented in section 3, is able to capture this e®ect.
Our focus on individual heterogeneity in attitudes to uncertainty re°ects both the popular
notion of the innovative entrepreneur as someone who is less averse to uncertainty, as well as
the views of economists such as Schumpeter (1928), who suggest that innovation is fuelled by
a distinct type of person, who takes pleasure in \doing what has not been done before" (ibid.,
p.380). In a recent NZ study, Pinfold (1998) observes that only 42.5% of start-up ventures
established in NZ during 1988 and 1989 survived for ¯ve years or more. However, a 1997
survey of start-up owners revealed that: \They rated the chances of their business surviving
its ¯rst ¯ve years at 75.7%, which was 23.5% higher than they rated the chances of similar
start-ups." (ibid., p.1) Clearly, optimism in the face of uncertainty seems characteristic of such
entrepreneurs.
Branson, the founder of Virgin Records and Virgin Airlines, is an archetypal innovative
entrepreneur. He claims that being an adventurer and an entrepreneur are similar, in that
both are \willing to go where most people wouldn't dare".6 However, he dismisses the notion
that they are risk-seekers, claiming instead that they are more comfortable than most with
uncertainty. The psychology literature (surveyed in WÄ arneryd (1988)) supports this view. It
reveals that owner-managers exhibit levels of risk aversion which are not signi¯cantly lower than
those of salaried managers, leading psychologists to speculate that any di®erences between the
two groups may indeed lie in the perception of non-objective risks (uncertainties).
Having recognized the importance of uncertainty to the individual, the challenge is to
determine its impact on the innovative behavior of ¯rms. Traditionally, ¯rm objectives have
been considered separately from the decision to innovate. Jensen (1982) considers the manner
in which heterogeneous prior beliefs of ¯rms can explain an S-shaped di®usion curve. We
depart from this convention by allowing the ¯rm's objective to arise from the attitude of the
entrepreneur and worker. This enables us to examine the interactions between the nature of
the technology that is operated, and the characteristics of members of the ¯rm who operate
the technology. The latter determines what \sort" of ¯rm it is: its objectives and mode
of operation. As Drµ eze (1985, p.5) points out, ¯rms, unlike human beings, have no \visceral
reaction to uncertainty". He argues that in the face of uncertainty and incomplete markets, the
objectives of the ¯rm need to be induced from the objectives of the owners and workers. While
Kihlstrom and La®ont (1979) and others have recognized this in single technology models,
its added signi¯cance in economies with multiple technologies does not appear to be fully
appreciated. Access to jobs in ¯rms employing other technologies means that workers must
tacitly agree to the ¯rm's objectives, even if not explicitly bearing any of the uncertainty. An
employer, for example, might personally prefer a highly uncertain enterprise about which they
are extremely optimistic, but choose to run a more cautious one due to the lack of potential
workers who share their optimism (or demand an exorbitant wage to in order to buy into the
entrepreneur's \folly").
5\Leave the identity crisis to corporations," Management Today (10 May 2000).
6\What it takes to Start a Startup," Fortune (July 1999) 139(11): pp.135-140.
3Indeed, after the crash of dot-com stocks, internet companies reported di±culty recruiting
workers, and many hurried to eliminate \dot-com" from their names.7 As workers in these
companies found themselves facing redundancies, recruitment consultants in the industry rec-
ommend that
\job hunters act like venture capitalists and evaluate prospective employers' business
plans. This means not just looking at the job itself, but also taking stock of how
experienced the leaders are, what level of competition the company faces, how deep
its pockets are and whether the company has any unique value to bring to the
market beyond an advertising campaign."8
Many dot-com ideas are thought to °ounder, not for want of entrepreneurial vision, but for
want of workers who share that vision. Indeed, it is often observed that when a ¯rm changes
its \strategic direction" executives often leave the ¯rm, because of their lack of con¯dence in
the new direction. In our model, one of the costs of innovating is hiring workers willing to work
in a highly uncertain industry.
The evolution of new industries in practice closely re°ects Schumpeter's ideas on innovation
and di®usion. The familiar pattern of an S-shaped di®usion curve, where the adoption rate of
new technology is initially slow and then becomes more rapid as the industry evolves, has been
discussed by a number of authors, who o®er a variety of explanations as to why some ¯rms
wait before adopting a new technology, while others jump in early. We show that an S-shaped
di®usion pro¯le can be motivated by the changing objectives of the ¯rm. We argue that as
uncertainty is resolved, the very nature of entrepreneurship and the employment relationship
changes.
Firms utilizing new technology move through three distinct phases. If uncertainty is suf-
¯ciently large, then it pervades the whole organization, with workers and employers a®ected
alike. These infant industries are characterized by owners and workers who share a similar
optimism in the new industry { both owners and workers are Bulls { and share the expected
pro¯ts equally. We label this ¯rm entrepreneurial, since it has a number of the hall-marks of
new ventures and start-ups, where workers are remunerated through options and are driven by
the same vision as the owner.
As the new industry matures and the chances of success are known more precisely, more staid
and cautious bears enter the market as workers, which radically alters changes the nature of the
¯rm. The new structure may be described as corporate. Only the owners are optimists, while
the workers are cautious types whose wage contract shields them from much of the uncertainty.
Hence, in comparison to an entrepreneurial ¯rm, the Bullish owners of the corporate enterprise
face lower labor costs. The corporate structure gives owners additional surplus in exchange for
bearing extra uncertainty.
The switch to the corporate phase provides added impetus to di®usion. Bulls are freed up
from labor duties to start new ¯rms; a greater proportion of the population is able to e®ectively
participate in the innovative sector; and wages are reduced, as bears o®er cheaper labor than
7For example, Shopnow.com changed to Network Commerce Inc. (\The shame of dot-coms," Computerworld
(August 7, 2000) 34(32): 52-53).
8Ibid.
4Bulls, whose optimistic views about the returns to ¯rm ownership imply a higher reservation
wage. This corresponds to the steep part of the di®usion curve.
As uncertainty falls further, we eventually enter a third phase in which bears are happy to
take on the role of ¯rm ownership in the new sector. This new type of ¯rm, with pessimists at
all levels is referred to as bureaucratic.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the economy and the decision-
making framewor we employ. Section 3 is the more technical part of the paper; ¯rst, we de¯ne
an equilibrium and show it exists under failry mild conditions; then we introduce innovation-
proof equilibria, and show they exist under no additional requirements. Section 4 discusses
some properties of innovation-proof equilibria. Section 5 discusses di®usion of innovations in
our economy. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Entrepreneurial Economy
The entrepreneurial economy consists of several industries. An industry's production func-
tion will be more-or-less suppressed in the analysis. Each industry's income possibilities are
subject to risk, although agents are not fully informed about this process. Therefore, the at-
titude of agents to situations where outcomes are governed by stochastic processes with vague
information is central to understanding the motivation for innovation.
2.1 Decision making under uncertainty
There is a ¯nite set £ of payo®-relevant states. To describe the uncertainty surrounding the
realization of the payo®-relevant state, we introduce a set S of fundamental states, endowed
with a ¾{algebra § and a commonly known probability measure pS. We take S to be the unit
interval [0;1], § the usual Borel ¾{algebra on S, and pS the Lebesgue measure on (S;§), unless
otherwise speci¯ed. The payo®{relevant states are related to the fundamental states by a mea-
surable information correspondence ¡ : S ³ £. If fundamental state s is realized, the available
information implies that the payo®{relevant state is some µ 2 ¡(s), but nothing else is known
about the relative likelihoods of states in ¡(s). Hence, if ¡ is singleton-valued (a function), then
knowledge of pS and ¡ implies a commonly known probability on £. Otherwise, the available
information about the stochastic process by which payo®-relevant states are realized may be
too vague to yield a well-de¯ned probability.



















What is the probability of event fµ1g? One can identify a lower and upper bound, 1
3 and
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it. However, there is no basis for choosing any particular point in this interval as being
uniquely \correct". Similarly, one can identify lower and upper bounds for any other
subset of £.
5This formalization of vagueness of information is due to Dempster (1967).9 Because the
source and structure of uncertainty is precisely speci¯ed, one can examine the comparative
static e®ects of changes to the nature or degree of this uncertainty. For example, if ¡(s) µ ^ ¡(s)
for all s 2 S, then it is natural to say that ¡ describes a situation involving less uncertainty
than ^ ¡.
Following Dempster, we say the collection of upper bounds for subsets of £ induced by ¡ is
the upper probability on f£; P(£)g, and the collection of lower bounds is the lower probability.10
Formally, the upper probability of event E 2 P(£) is given by
v(E) := pS (fs 2 S j ¡(s) \ E 6= ;g)
and the lower probability is
v(E) := pS (fs 2 S j ; 6= ¡(s) µ Eg):
Unless ¡ is a function, these objects need not be probabilities because they may violate the usual
additivity condition. They are examples of a more general class of objects called capacities,
which were extensively studied by Choquet (1953-4). When ¡ is singleton-valued, the upper
and lower probabilities coincide, and their common value is an ordinary probability measure.
Example 1 (continued) The lower probability of fµ1g is 1
3, that of fµ2; µ3g is similarly 1
3,
while the lower probability of £ is 1. This illustrates the fact that lower probabilities are
superadditive. Conversely, the upper probabilities of fµ1g and fµ2; µ3g are 2
3, illustrating
that upper probabilities are subadditive. For a full characterization of the properties of
these capacities, see Chateauneuf and Ja®ray (1989), Dempster (1967) and Shafer (1976).
Upper and lower probabilities may also usefully be described by their MÄ obius inverse(see
Chateauneuf and Ja®ray (1989) and Shafer (1976)). This inverse is the mapping m : P(£) !
[0; 1] de¯ned as follows
m(E) = pS (fs 2 S j ¡(s) = Eg) 8E 2 P(£):









m(A) = 1 ¡ v(Ec):
Let f : £ ! R be a random variable with range fr1;r2;:::;rng, indexed such that r1 <
r2 < ¢¢¢ < rk. How do agents evaluate these potentially vague revenue lotteries? Dempster
9See also Mukerji (1997) for a useful discussion in the context of economic decision-making.
10P(£) denotes the power set of £; i.e. the set of all subsets of £.
6(1967) suggests employing the Choquet integral. De¯ne Ei = f¡1(ri), for i = 1;2;:::;k. The
Choquet expected value of f with respect to the capacity v is











When v is additive (i.e. a probability measure) this is equivalent to a standard expected value
calculation. For general capacities v, the Choquet integral satis¯es the condition
Ev (af + b) = a[Evf] + b
for arbitrary random variable f and constants a and b. However, it will not be the case in
general that
Ev (f + g) = Evf + Evg:
A su±cient condition for additivity of the Choquet expectation operator is comonotonicity of f
and g (Schmeidler (1986)). The variables f and g are comonotonic if there do not exist states
µ;µ0 2 £ such that f(µ) > f(µ0) and g(µ) < g(µ0).
Bulls and bears
We assume that all agents are risk neutral: that is, their objective is to maximize the Choquet
expected value of their income. We also assume there are two types of agents: Bulls and bears.
When calculating Choquet expectations, Bulls employ the upper probability, and bears employ
the lower probability induced by ¡ on f£; P(£)g.11 For any random variable f : £ ! R, denote
by Ef its Choquet expectation with respect to the upper probability, and by Ef its Choquet
expectation with respect to the lower probability. Observe in particular that
Ef ¸ Ef
for any f. Bulls and bears clearly have beliefs which are equally consistent with the under-
lying information structure, but Bulls choose to interpret the available information in a more
optimistic fashion than bears.
Finally, let us o®er one further perspective on this decision-making process. The set of
additive probabilities on f£; P(£)g that are consistent with pS and ¡ is known as the core of
the lower probability v.12 Formally,
core(v) = f¼ 2 ¢(£) j p(E) ¸ v(E) 8E µ £g
= f¼ 2 ¢(£) j p(E) · v(E) 8E µ £g
where ¢(£) denotes the set of all additive probability measures on f£; P(£)g. A natural
de¯nition of Bullish optimism from this perspective would be the tendency to evaluate any
random variable f : £ ! R by calculating its expected value using the most \favorable"
11These are special cases of the axiomatic decision model of Ja®ray and Wakker (1994).
12See Schmeidler (1989).
7probability from core(v). In fact, such a de¯nition of Bullish preferences is entirely consistent








Given the unfamiliarity of most economists with the process of Choquet integration, this al-
ternative characterization of Bullish and bearish preferences can be a comforting aid to one's
intuitive understanding of their behavior. For example, if ¡(s) µ ^ ¡(s) for all s 2 S, then, in
obvious notation, core(v) µ core(^ v). That is, the core shrinks as uncertainty reduces, which is
what one would expect. This causes bearish and Bullish behavior to converge.
2.2 The Economy
The economy consists of a continuum of agents, divided into Bulls and bears, and I industries.
Agents simultaneously choose occupations based on common information about the processes
determining revenues in the various industries, a given vector of industry wage rates, and com-
mon expectations about the equilibrium densities of ¯rms in each industry. Each industry's
production function will be more-or-less suppressed in the analysis. We are also not specif-
ically interested in contracting within the ¯rm13. As Baumol (1968, 1993) points out, the
entrepreneurial function is distinct from the managerial one. The latter is more concerned
with day-to-day matters such as ¯ne-tuning the input mix in production. These decisions are
concealed within a reduced form revenue function and a simplifying assumption that each ¯rm
hires precisely one worker.14
A ¯rm's revenue depends on the density of ¯rms in each industry plus some stochastic
factors. Formally, the revenue function of a ¯rm in industry i is Ri(µ;±), where µ 2 £ is the
payo®-relevant state, and ± is a vector of densities, ±i being the total density of ¯rms in industry







The object of our analysis is the following abstract economy.




















13Kelsey and Spanjers (1997) focus on this issue.
14By contrast, Kihlstrom and La®ont (1979) explicitly include a managerial decision about the number of
workers to hire. It should also be noted that decisions about the internal organisation of the ¯rm arguably
fall on the boundary between the managerial and entrepreneurial function, as these determine how informa-
tion is processed and uncertainty managed within the ¯rm. Our simpli¯ed ¯rm structure ignores these issues.
Addressing them is a matter demanding further attention in future research.
8where (i) ¡ is a measurable correspondence from S to £; (ii) Ri gives the revenue of a typical
¯rm in industry i when it hires exactly one worker; and (iii) ® 2 [0;1] divides the unit interval
into Bulls, agents with indices in the sub-interval [0;®), and bears, agents with indices in the
sub-interval [®;1].
Revenues
The revenue function summarizes all input choices other than the hiring of the single worker.
It also summarizes the process of output price determination. With a continuum of ¯rms, the
most natural assumption is that ¯rms are price-takers on these output markets, and prices
are set to match aggregate demand to the supply implied by the vector ±. However, strategic
interaction within or across industries in the determination of output prices is also compatible
with the model.
Note that Ri depends on the entire vector of industry densities. It is natural to suppose
that Ri is weakly decreasing in ±i. If di®erent industries produce substitute goods, or if there
is a ¯xed consumer pool for which all I industries compete, then Ri may also be weakly
decreasing in each ±j. However, complementarity of inter-industry demand systems can also
be accommodated.
An important special case in which it is natural to think of Ri decreasing in each ±j occurs
when the model is used to describe I producers of di®erentiated products within the same
industry. This interpretation allows us to consider issues of product innovations within an
industry, as opposed to the innovative introduction of an entirely new product category.
We shall make the following technical assumption throughout:
Assumption 1 Each Ri is bounded and is also continuous in ±.
This assumption is needed to guarantee existence of equilibria { see Theorem 3.1.
Given a density vector ±, industry i's revenue is a random variable on f£; P(£)g. Note
that although each revenue function Ri is expressed as a function of the same µ, this does not
imply that each is subject to the same uncertainty.15 For example, it may be that µ 2 RI, and
for each i, the value of Ri is independent of µj for every j 6= i. In this case, the uncertainty
in industry i depends on the precision of the available information about the ith component
of µ, and this may be quite di®erent to the uncertainty surrounding the jth component. For
example, one might wish to distinguish \established" industries, whose stochastic revenues are
known precisely, from currently inactive industries (potential innovations) for which there is
great uncertainty about pro¯tability. Our framework allows this distinction to be modelled in
a natural way.
3 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, labor markets clear, and the density of ¯rms in each industry is required to
match agents' common expectations. The latter is analogous to the more familiar assumption
15Correlation of random shocks across technologies matters only at the macro level. For the decisions of
individual agents it matters not, since each agent can work in only one ¯rm. Correlation would a®ect their
occupation choice only if they could divide their time among several jobs.
9that agents correctly anticipate output prices in the various output markets. However, as our
interest is in the supply side { labor markets and ¯rm formation { we suppress these output
prices in the analysis.16
Each agent in an economy E has 2I occupational options: wage-earning or ¯rm ownership
in one of the I industries. An agent selects exactly one occupation: they cannot divide their
time among a portfolio of jobs. In each industry i, ¯rm owners obey the following:
Assumption 2 Each owner employs one worker. An employment contract speci¯es a wage
level wi ¸ 0 and the following limited liability clause: if state µ 2 £ is realized, the entrepreneur
pays the worker
minfwi; Ri(µ; ±)g
The limited liability clause implies that wage earning need not generate a sure income.17
To evaluate returns from the various occupational options, agents need to know the vector
w = (w1; w2; :::; wI) of equilibrium wage rates for each industry, and the equilibrium vector of
industry densities ± = (±1; ±2; :::; ±I): For given values of w and ±, agents choose occupations
that maximize their Choquet expected income. In making these calculations, bears employ the
lower probability, and Bulls the upper probability.
Given (w;±), a Bull obtains utility
E[Ri(µ; ±) ¡ minfwi; Ri(µ; ±)g]
from owning a ¯rm in industry i, and utility
E[minfwi; Ri(µ; ±)g]
from being a wage-laborer in the same industry. The utility obtained by bears from these oc-
cupations may be described similarly. Let O = f1;2;:::;2Ig be a set of indices for occupations
in E. We shall index the occupation of being a ¯rm owner in industry i by (2i ¡ 1) 2 O, and
the occupation of being a wage earner in industry i by 2i 2 O.
De¯nition 2 Given an economy E and vectors (w;±), the Bulls' optimal occupation set BRE;B(w; ±) µ
O is the set of occupations that maximize a Bull's Choquet expected income. The bears' optimal
occupation set BRE;b(w; ±) µ O is de¯ned similarly.
In addition to the vectors (w;±), an equilibrium must also specify the occupation of each
agent. This is described using an allocation function.
16In particular, we implicitly assume that demand conditions on the output markets are independent of the
equilibrium incomes of the agents in the model. This assumption is made for simplicity, and it is implicit in
Kihlstrom and La®ont (1979).
17Although we have not done so, it would be straightforward to elaborate the model so that agents also have
heterogeneous endowments of initial wealth, and must draw on personal wealth to pay wages if necessary (as in
Kihlstrom and La®ont (1979)). Then, wealthier agents may be able to pay lower wages in equilibrium because
of the lower likelihood of default. Formally, this e®ect is similar to a credit constraint in a model where owners
must invest in capital in order to start their businesses, and credit markets are imperfect. In each case, personal
wealth has a positive e®ect on the pro¯tability of business ownership. Hence, wealthier agents are more likely
to become owners, as some empirical evidence { such as Evans and Jovanovic (1989) { suggests.
10De¯nition 3 An allocation function for the economy E is a Lebesgue measurable function
Á : [0; 1] ! O.
De¯nition 4 The triplet (w; ±; Á) is an entrepreneurial equilibrium of E if
(i) Á(j) 2 BRE;B(w; ±) 8j 2 [0; ®);









= ±i for each i 2 f1;2;:::;Ig.
Thus, an entrepreneurial equilibrium speci¯es wages, industry densities and individual oc-
cupations such that, when all agents anticipate (w;±) and each chooses his or her occupation
optimally, all labor markets clear and the common expectations of ± are con¯rmed. It is quite
possible that some industries fail to operate in equilibrium: that is, the vector ± may have some
zero components. Hence, the equilibrium endogenously determines which industries operate
(for example, which innovations are implemented), as well as the wage rates and ¯rm densities
in each operating industry.
Theorem 3.1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, every economy E has an equilibrium (w; ±; Á).
Proof: Let ©(w;±) denote the set of allocation functions for E consistent with (w;±). Denote








¯ ¯ ¯ Á 2 ©(w;±)
o
Notice that elements of Z (w;±) belong to the unit simplex ¢2I¡1 µ R2I
+ . Now let us de¯ne





1 if j = 2i ¡1 or j = 2(i ¡ I) ¡ 1
¡1 if j = 2i and i · 2I
0 otherwise
Letting19 X (w;±) = C Z (w;±), we see that each x 2 X (w;±) is a 2I-vector whose ¯rst I com-
ponents give the net excess density of owners in each industry associated with some allocation
consistent with (w;±), and whose second I components give the total density of owners in each
industry associated with the same consistent allocation. This transformation induces a one-
to-one mapping between Z (w;±) and X (w;±) since C is non-singular. Alternatively, one can
recover z 2 Z (w;±) from x = Cz 2 X (w;±). Therefore, X (w;±) is a subset of B := C¢2I¡1.
Next, extend each Ri to the domain ££ [0; 1]I as follows:












18In (iii), Leb denotes Lebesgue measure.
19To interpret the following transformation, assume that points in Euclidean space are column vectors.
11These extended Ri functions are still strictly positive, and continue to satisfy Assumption 3.






For arbitrary vectors y 2 R2I, let projI y denote the projection of y onto its ¯rst I compo-













The foregoing observations and de¯nitions con¯rm that D := [0; W]I £ [0;1]I £ B is a












: £ : fproj¡I xg : £ : X (w;±)
One can easily verify that » is well-de¯ned on its domain, and that its range is contained in D.
To see that any ¯xed point of » determines an equilibrium of E, suppose that (w;±;Á) 2
» (w;±;Á). We must therefore have
± = proj¡I x (2)
Then, su±ces to show that
x(I) := projI x = 0 (3)
since (3) implies that all labor markets can clear given expectations (w;±). From (2), we thus
obtain that ± gives the corresponding vector of industry densities (which coincides, by (3), with





as required. Hence, (w;±;Á) is an equilibrium for any Á 2 ©(w;±) generating x.
We now verify that (3) holds. Suppose instead that x
(I)
i > 0 for some i. The de¯nition of
» and the fact that (w;±;Á) is a ¯xed point imply wi = W. But then all agents strictly prefer
being wage-earners in industry i than being ¯rm owners in industry i. This follows because Ri
is strictly positive by assumption: no matter how pessimistic agents' beliefs, wage-earners in
industry i must expect a strictly positive income when wi = W. Since x 2 X (w;±), this means
x
(I)
i · 0, which is a contradiction. Assuming x
(I)
i < 0 leads to a contradiction by a symmetric
argument. Equation (3) is therefore con¯rmed.
Summarising, we de¯ned the correspondence » : D ¶ D, and deduced that for any ¯xed
point (w; ±; x), there is a Á such that (w;±;Á) is an equilibrium of E. The ¯nal step is to show
that » does indeed have a ¯xed point. But » satis¯es all the conditions of Kakutani's Fixed
Point Theorem. The arguments are somewhat lengthy, and may be found in Appendix A. This
completes the proof. 2
12Discussion of the equilibrium concept
Unfortunately, De¯nition 4 is not entirely satisfactory as it stands. In particular, it may
preclude innovation on the basis of irrational expectations about labor costs. Suppose, for
example, that ±i = 0 in equilibrium. How do we interpret the common wage expectation wi? A
potential entrant into industry i would presumably assess the wage costs of operating in that
industry to be equal to the minimum wage necessary to attract some other agent away from
his or her current occupation. However, there is no reason why wi should correspond to this
wage rate in general.
Example 3 Let the fundamental state space be S = S1 [ S2, where S1 and S2 are disjoint,
and de¯ne the information mapping
¡(s) =
½
fµ1g if s 2 S1
fµ2; µ3g if s 2 S2
with payo®-relevant state space
£ = fµ1; µ2; µ3g
Finally, assume the measure pS satis¯es pS(Sj) = 1
2 for each j 2 f1;2g. Thus, the lower
and upper probabilities of the event fµ1g are both 1
2; while events fµ2g and fµ3g each
have lower probability 0, and upper probability 1
2.
Consider a two industry economy (I = 2) with revenue functions
Ri(µk; ±) = 1 i;k 2 f1;2g
R1(µ3; ±) = 4 and R2(µ3; ±) =
9
2
Thus, ¯rm density has no impact on revenue, and industry 2 weakly dominates industry
1 as a generator of revenue.
Suppose agents anticipate the following wages and densities:








We claim that (^ w; ^ ±; Á) is an equilibrium for the allocation function Á which assigns all







































R2(µ; ^ ±) ¡ minf2;R2(µ; ^ ±)g
i
= 0
So BRE;B(^ w; ^ ±) = f1;4g and BRE;b(^ w; ^ ±) = f2;4g.
However, an equilibrium in which industry 2 does not operate seems a matter for concern.
Suppose an enterprising Bull from the above equilibrium contemplates closing her current
¯rm in industry 1 and opening a monopoly in industry 2. This Bull could o®er her current
(industry 1) worker the chance to work in the new enterprise for a wage of ~ w2 = 1. The
worker will be happy to accept, as the o®ered wage provides precisely the same expected
income as he is currently earning in industry 1. The Bull owner of the industry 2 monopoly
anticipates a pro¯t of
E
h





which strictly exceeds her current expected pro¯t in industry 1.
Part of the problem lies with the standard de¯nition of equilibrium. As noted by Makowski
(1980) in a di®erent context, the standard notion of Walrasian equilibrium is not entirely
satisfactory when the commodoties sold in equilibrium are determined endogenously. In that
framework, the prices of \non-produced" commodities are free to be anything. On the other
hand, some of these prices may leave incentives for ¯rms to open the corresponding market and
starting the production of that particular good. In that framework, Makowski de¯ned a \full
walrasion equilibrium" as the case in which this pro¯t-making opportunities to innovation are
absent. In the following, we impose an equilibrium re¯nement in a similar spirit.
3.1 Innovation-Proofness
Equilibria which leave such pro¯table opportunities unexploited are clearly unacceptable. Def-
inition 5 re¯nes the equilibrium concept to eliminate such possibilities. It requires that no
lucrative entrepreneurial opportunity is left unexploited.
De¯nition 5 Consider an economy E, and let (w; ±; Á) be an entrepreneurial equilibrium of
E. This equilibrium is innovation-proof if there does not exist an industry i with ±i = 0, a
potential entrepreneur k 2 [0; 1], a potential worker k0 2 [0; 1] (k 6= k0), and a wage level
^ wi > 0 such that
(a) Evk0 [minf^ wi;Ri(µ; ±)g] is no less than the utility k0 obtains from his current occupation
Á(k0) (where vk0 denotes the capacity of agent k0); and
(b) Evk [Ri(µ; ±) ¡ minf^ wi;Ri(µ; ±)g] strictly exceeds the utility k obtains from her current
occupation Á(k) (where vk denotes the capacity of agent k).
The concept of innovation-proofness represents a conceptual modi¯cation of the standard
logic of price-taking equilibrium. Potential innovators are assumed not only to know the wages
in existing industries, but also the reservation wage necessary to start a ¯rm in any new industry.
The (unmodelled) process by which this reservation wage information is promulgated within a
14market economy is clearly di®erent to the (unmodelled) process by which wages in currently
active labor markets are made known.
Formulating conjectures about reservation wages in inactive labor markets is fundamental
to the process of innovative entrepreneurship. However, unlike writers in the Austrian tradition
such as Kirzner, we do not di®erentiate agents in terms of their ability to formulate accurate
conjectures of this sort (their \alertness" to entrepreneurial opportunity). Instead, we assume
that all agents have perfect knowledge of reservation wage levels in all potential industries, and
equal awareness of the revenue functions of inactive industries. Relaxation of this assumption
may be useful, but is beyond the scope of the present paper. Innovation in our model is
therefore driven not by di®erences in agents' awareness of the entrepreneurial opportunities,
but by di®erences in their responses to the uncertainties that may surround revenue levels in
new industries.
In summary, innovation-proofness ensures that equilibria are robust to lucrative innovations
when all agents have equal access to information about potential revenue functions, and assess
the implicit wage rates in inactive industries at the reservation wage of the \cheapest" potential
worker.
The following Theorem veri¯es the internal consistency of our model.
Theorem 3.2 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, every economy E possesses an innovation-proof
entrepreneurial equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.
4 Optimism and occupational choice
Kihlstromand La®ont (1979) (henceforth KL79) obtained a psychological pro¯le of entrepreneurs
as the less risk-averse members of the community. We have already mentioned that this psy-
chological characterization does not stand up to empirical scrutiny.
Moreover, KL79 employs a model with only a single technology (labor market), and in
which wages must be paid with certainty, out of the employer's personal resources if necessary.
Neither assumption is realistic, and both seriously hamper the model's capacity to say anything
about entrepreneurial innovation. The identity of entrepreneurs, and in particular of innovators,
will depend in potentially complex ways on general equilibrium pressures in a multi-technology
economy, and on the institutional framework in which labor contracting takes place. Indeed,
in Kihlstrom and La®ont (1982, 1983), the earlier (negative) correlation between risk aversion
and entrepreneurship is lost through the introduction of a richer contracting framework.
The present model departs slightly from KL79's labor market institutions, by allowing wage
default. This re°ects the obvious fact that employees in new start-ups may often face as much
uncertainty as the owner { if the ¯rm fails, all are out of pocket. However, we refrain from
introducing more °exible contracting arrangements, as our focus is on the general equilibrium
e®ects from the existence of multiple technologies.20 Despite the uncertainties of wage labor,
it remains true in our model that Bulls have a greater a±nity for ¯rm ownership, and bears a
greater propensity towards wage-earning roles. More precisely:
20See Rigotti and Ryan (2000) for a model in which fully state-contingent employment contracts are allowed.
In that model, however, there is only one technology.
15Lemma 4.1 (a) If bears prefer to be ¯rm owners rather than workers, so do Bulls. Formally:
E[Ri(µ; ±) ¡ minfwi; Ri(µ; ±)g] ¸ E[minfwi; Ri(µ; ±)g]
implies
E[Ri(µ; ±) ¡ minfwi; Ri(µ; ±)g] ¸ E[minfwi; Ri(µ; ±)g]:
(b) If Bulls prefer to be workers rather than ¯rm owners, so do bears. Formally:
E[minfwi; Ri(µ; ±)g] ¸ E[Ri(µ; ±) ¡ minfwi; Ri(µ; ±)g]
implies
E[minfwi; Ri(µ; ±)g] ¸ E[Ri(µ; ±) ¡ minfwi; Ri(µ; ±)g]:
Neither converse is true in general.
Proof: It is straightforward to verify that Ri(µ; ±) ¡ minfwi; Ri(µ; ±)g, minfwi; Ri(µ; ±)g and
2minfwi; Ri(µ; ±)g are pairwise comonotone. Hence
E[Ri(µ; ±) ¡ minfwi; Ri(µ; ±)g] ¸ E[minfwi; Ri(µ; ±)g] (4)
if and only if
E[Ri(µ; ±)] ¸ 2E[minfwi; Ri(µ; ±)g] (5)
, E[Ri(µ; ±) ¡ 2minfwi; Ri(µ; ±)g] ¸ 0 (6)
Therefore, using (6), it follows that (4) implies
E[Ri(µ; ±) ¡ 2minfwi; Ri(µ; ±)g] ¸ 0;
which is equivalent to
E[Ri(µ; ±) ¡ minfwi; Ri(µ; ±)g] ¸ E[minfwi; Ri(µ; ±)g]:
This proves (a). Case (b) is proved in similar fashion. Counter-examples to the converses are
easy to construct. ¤
An obvious corollary of Lemma 4.1 is that when I = 1 and ® 2 (0;1), there will always
be some Bulls who own ¯rms and some bears allocated to laboring jobs in an entrepreneurial
equilibrium (unless relevant uncertainty is absent; e.g. ¡ is a function).21 This is the analogue of
KL79's result on entrepreneurial psychology. Hence, our focus on uncertainty rather than risk,
and our Assumption 2 do not, on their own, cause signi¯cant departures from KL79. However,
when embedded in our multi-technology general equilibrium model, they do have interesting
implications for the process of innovation di®usion. We shall illustrate these implications via
an example in the next section.
21>From the proof of Lemma 4.1, relevant uncertainty is present provided
E[R1(µ; ±) ¡ 2minfw1; R1(µ; ±)g] > E[R1(µ; ±) ¡ 2minfw1; R1(µ; ±)g]:
165 Uncertainty and the di®usion of innovations
Much of the existing literature on innovation is concerned with the process of di®usion of new
products and techniques. An aspect of this process which is discussed by a number of existing
models is the e®ects of uncertainty reduction on di®usion. As ¯rms innovate, they release
information about their novel product or technology. This reduces the uncertainty surrounding
the value of the innovation, and hence will tend to promote or discourage further \innovators",
depending on the nature of the information released.
Jensen (1982) and Vettas (1998) are notable examples. In the latter paper, entry leads to
learning by both potential suppliers and consumers, and therefore facilitates further entry. In
Vettas, however, ¯rms are exogenously given, with no role for the entrepreneur. The learning on
the consumer side is by observing other consumers buying the same good twice. For example,
as he suggests in footnote 4, the e®ect of observing ones neighbor purchasing a car the second
time around has an e®ect. However, the reliance on this sort of signal means that learning will
often be very slow since consumer durables tend to have a high life expectancy.
Schumpeter, for example, saw entrepreneurs as pioneers into uncertain endeavors, whose
e®orts cleared a path along which \swarms" of more conservative business-people would follow,
should the reconnaissance reports prove favorable. This accords well with the empirical evidence
of S-shaped di®usion curves for successful innovations. However, it also posits both a mechanism
of di®usion (uncertainty reduction), and a central agent (the innovative entrepreneur) driving
the process. The combined role of uncertainty and entrepreneurship has been given scant
attention in the formal theoretical literature on di®usion.
Dempster's model of uncertainty is ideally suited to ¯lling this gap. When the graph of ¡
is properly contained in that of ¡0, then the former represents a situation of less uncertainty
than the latter. This allows us to study the e®ects of uncertainty reduction on equilibrium.
Importantly, the preferences of each agent may be consistently de¯ned across these uncertainty-
ordered economies: Bulls continue to use the upper { and bears the lower { envelope of the
(shrinking) set of probabilities generated by the information correspondences. Under a Bayesian
model of behavior, such as SEU, individuals choose a single probability from this set. If the
set shrinks so as to exclude their chosen probability, then a new probability { hence entirely
new preferences { must be speci¯ed.
Let us therefore consider a simple example of the di®usion of a successful innovation. Set
I = 2, and de¯ne £ = f1;2g, R1(µ;±) = 10 ¡ 2±1 and
R2(µ; ±) =
½
21 ¡ 4±2 if µ = 1
1 if µ = 2
Technology 1, which we may think of as the basis for a well-established industry, exhibits no
uncertainty whatsoever. Technology 2, however, which we shall suppose to correspond to a
newly available potential innovation, fails completely in state 2.22
Let " 2 [0;1] index both time and the level of certainty about technology 2. At time ",
uncertainty is generated by the information correspondence ¡" with MÄ obius inverse m" such
that m"(f1g) = 3"
4 , m"(f2g) = "
4, and m"(f1;2g) = 1 ¡ ". Denote by v" and v" the lower and
upper probabilities respectively that are induced by ¡".
22Think of its having a scrap value of 1 in this eventuality.
17It is easily checked that ¡"0(s) µ ¡"(s) for all s when "0 > ". Hence, as " increases,
uncertainty reduces. In the limit { when " = 1 { uncertainty vanishes, as ¡1 induces a unique
probability: m1(f1g) = 3
4 and m1(f2g) = 1
4. The innovative technology 2 is \successful" in the
sense that its limiting expected revenue exceeds that of technology 1:
Ev1 [R2] = 16 ¡ 3±2
which strictly exceeds R1 for all ±1 and ±2 = 1
2 ¡ ±1.
For each ", the economy has a unique innovation-proof equilibrium, as we shortly verify.
This allows us to study the process of di®usion. Beginning with " = 0, we show that some agents
do choose to innovate (operate technology 2). We assume that this releases information, causing
" to rise over time. We may then examine how the equilibrium changes as this uncertainty is
gradually reduced. As we shall see, a rich di®usion structure emerges.23
Initially, only Bulls enter industry 2, both as ¯rm owners and wage-earners. We may think
of these initial entrants as small-scale start-ups, in which all ¯rm participants face considerable
¯nancial uncertainty. The culture of the ¯rms in these infant industries is optimistic, both
workers and bosses share the optimistic belief that their °edgling product is bound for greatness,
and both share expected revenues equally. We label such a ¯rm entrepreneurial.
A recent PBS television special \Triumph of the Nerds: The Rise of Accidental Empires"
charted the di®usion of PCs. An early participant in the industry commented: \Most of the
people in the industry (at that time) were young because the guys who had any real experience
were too smart to get involved in all these crazy little machines."24
After some time, these entrepreneurial enterprises release su±cient information to attract
bears into the industry { ¯rst as workers, and later as ¯rm owners. As uncertainty falls
below a critical level, the possibility of operating industry 2 ¯rms along more corporate lines,
with uncertainty-averse workers enjoying reasonable ¯nancial security, emerges. This gives ¯rm
owners in the new sector access to a large, and relatively cheap, workforce, providing additional
stimulus to innovation. This spurt in di®usion may be interpreted as the steep portion of the
S-shaped empirical di®usion curve, and corresponds to Schumpeter's \swarm" of conservative
imitators.
To make good on these claims, let us ¯rst observe that the absence of uncertainty in industry




R1(µ; ±) = 5 ¡ ±1 (7)
For industry 2 we have
Ev" [R2(µ; ±)] = 1 + v"(f1g)(20 ¡ 4±2)
= 1 + (4 ¡ ")(5 ¡ ±2) (8)
and
Ev" [R2(µ; ±)] = 1 + v"(f1g)(20 ¡ 4±2)
= 1 + 3"(5 ¡ ±2) (9)
23Note that while our analysis is essentially a comparative static exercise, it may be shown to be equivalent
to a dynamic model where agents are forward looking.








for all ± and all ", so there is always an occupational option in industry 2 that Bulls strictly
prefer to either occupation in industry 1. Hence, in equilibrium, all Bulls must be in industry 2,
which implies ±2 ¸ ®
2. Therefore, the economy is gaining experience of industry 2 continuously
from time " = 0, justifying our use of " to index both time and the degree of uncertainty
reduction.
Conversely, from (7) and (9), it is clear that initially, when " is near zero, no bears occupy
roles in industry 2. In particular, if " = 0, it is clear that the unique innovation-proof equilib-
rium has all Bulls in industry 2 and all bears in industry 1. High uncertainty is particularly
attractive to Bulls, because of the potential it allows for high rewards. For bears, on the other
hand, it conveys only the perils of possible disaster. As uncertainty reduces (" rises), Bullish
dreams of untold riches are forced within more realistic bounds, while bearish anxieties are
alleviated. Hence, the former group become less sanguine about the opportunities in industry
2, while the latter become less averse to participating in innovative enterprises.
In order to describe the equilibria for " > 0, let us de¯ne the following three functions.
First, de¯ne w2(±2;") as the wage in industry 2 at which Bulls are indi®erent between ¯rm
ownership and wage-laboring in industry 2. In other words, w2(±2;") is the solution to25
1
2
[1 + (4 ¡ ")(5 ¡ ±2)] = Ev" [minfw2; R2(µ; ±)g] (10)
Since the left-hand side exceeds 1, we must have w2 ¸ 1 to satisfy (10). It is also clearly
necessary that w2 · 21 ¡ 4±2. Therefore, if (10) holds, w2 is fully paid in state µ = 1, and
workers receive $1 in state µ = 2. Hence:
Ev" [minfw2; R2(µ; ±)g] = 1 + v"(f1g)(w2 ¡ 1)
= 1 +
(4 ¡ ")(w2 ¡ 1)
4
from which it follows that




If w2 > w2(±2;"), then neither type wishes to own a ¯rm in industry 2. This is incompatible
with equilibrium, since we already know that ±2 ¸ ®
2. Hence w2 · w2(±2;").
We next derive a lower bound for w2. De¯ne w(±1;") as the wage at which bears are
indi®erent between owning a ¯rm and laboring in industry 2. Thus, w(±1;") solves
1
2
[1 + 3"(5 ¡ ±2)] = Ev" [minfw2; R2(µ; ±)g] (12)
If w2 < 1, then bears will strictly prefer an occupation in industry 1 to wage-laboring in
industry 2, so we shall assume for the purposes of solving (12) that w2 ¸ 1. In this case,




25Equation (10) follows by the logic leading to equation (5) in the proof of Lemma 4.1.
19so (12) implies




If w2 < w2(±2;"), then neither type will accept a wage earning position in a ¯rm in industry 2.
Therefore, w2 ¸ w2(±2;") in equilibrium.
Finally, de¯ne ^ w2(±2;") to be the wage at which bears are indi®erent between working in
industry 1 and accepting a wage-earning position in industry 2. That is, ^ w2(±2;") solves











(using the assumption w2 ¸ 1 as before). Solving (14) gives
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Figure 1: Critical w2 bounds
Observe that for each ±2, there is a unique "0 for which w2(±2;"0) = ^ w2(±2;"0), and a unique
"1 > "0 for which ^ w2(±2;"1) = w2(±2;"1).
Recall that w2(±2;") · w2 · w2(±2;") in equilibrium. Let us consider three exhaustive
cases: (i) w2(±2;") < w2 < w2(±2;"), (ii) w2 = w2(±2;") < w2(±2;"), and (iii) w2(±2;") <
w2(±2;") = w2.
If w2(±2;") < w2 < w2(±2;"), then all Bulls wish to own ¯rms in industry 2. Equilibrium
therefore requires that bears are happy to work in these ¯rms. Since ¯rm ownership in industry
202 is not optimal for bears, and ® < 1
2, some bears must remain in industry 1. Therefore, we
must have w2 = ^ w2(±2;") so that bears are indi®erent between industry 1 occupations and
wage-earning in industry 2. Thus, case (i) requires
w2(±2;") < w2 = ^ w2(±2;") < w2(±2;") (16)
Next take case (ii). Once again, all Bulls are owners of industry 2 ¯rms. Now bears are
equally happy owning or working in such ¯rms. Since some bearish workers are necessary, we
must have w2 ¸ ^ w2(±2;"). Thus, case (ii) requires
^ w2(±2;") · w2 = w2(±2;") (17)
Finally, in case (iii), any bears in industry 2 are workers, while Bulls are indi®erent between
the two industry 2 occupations. Since ® < 1
2, we cannot have all bears in industry 2, so it is
necessary that w2 · ^ w2(±2;"). Hence:
w2 = w2(±2;") · ^ w2(±2;") (18)
Combining (16){(18) with Figure 1, we see that for each (±;"), there is a unique candidate
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Figure 2: Candidate equilibrium w2 values
Thus, given ±2, if " · "0, then w2 = w2(±2;"). In other words, if uncertainty is very high (i.e.
early on in the di®usion process), then bears are unwilling to enter industry 2, so w2 must leave
Bulls indi®erent between ownership and wage-labor in industry 2. Also, it is clear that ±2 = ®
2
in this case.
21As uncertainty falls to " 2 ("0;"1), bears become attracted by the industry 2 wage. Since
they are not yet emboldened su±ciently to own ¯rms in industry 2, some bears must remain in
industry 1, so w2 = ^ w2(±2;"). Access to this comparatively cheaper bearish labor force causes
wages to drop more sharply during this phase of di®usion. Bulls are an expensive labor force
because of their perceived lucrative outside opportunity as owners in industry 2. Since bears
are less optimistic about the returns to this occupation, they have a lower reservation wage.





Finally, when " ¸ "1, uncertainty { and wages { have become so low that bears are happy
to own industry 2 ¯rms. Since a labor force is still required, we must have w2 = w2(±2;")





, and wages are rising. This represents the
maturity of the new industry, as its comparative advantage over the old industry 1 is revealed,
and the increasing expected returns must be shared with the labor force.
The foregoing description of the di®usion process is broadly accurate, but some details
remain to be tidied. Figure 2 is drawn for given ±2, while ±2 is clearly changing, at least
through the last two phases of the process. Our equilibrium reasoning must take this into
account. In fact, doing so changes matters only slightly: there is period between phases 2 and
3 at which ±2 = ® is constant. Once density ® of bears are working in industry 2, time must
pass and uncertainty reduce further before bears become happy to own such ¯rms and the next





































d e d ,
2
for    , 2 2 2 w
( ) e a , ˆ 1 2 w






, for    , 2 2 2 a d e d w
  ,
1







e ' e '' e ''' e ''''
Figure 4: Equilibrium w2 for each " 2 [0;1]
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Figure 5: Equilibrium ±2 for each " 2 [0;1]
Observe that Figures 4 and 5 imply a particular pattern of correlation between wages and
¯rm density in the new industry. This raises the possibility of empirical testing of the model.
Also, from Figure 5 we may discern the basis for an S-shaped di®usion curve. The °at portion
in the middle, where ±2 = ®, is largely an artefact of our assuming only two types of agent.
In reality, many will exist, with Bulls and bears occupying the two extremes of the spectrum.
Adding in these additional types is likely to smooth the curve into an S. Initially, a small group
of the most optimistic entrepreneurial types will test the waters, and di®usion will accelerate
only once uncertainty has reduced enough that the bulk of the economy's more conservative
agents are su±ciently convinced of its value. Observe that as this happens, the character of
industry 2 ¯rms will change. It will no longer be necessary to employ potential entrepreneurs
23in these ¯rms, as in the early stages of innovation. Instead, a larger labor force, made up
of uncertainty-averse individuals after steady, secure jobs, will become available. These will
be employed in preference to optimists, as they are cheaper. Firms in the innovative sector
mature from entrepreneurial operations, to corporate enterprises. As potential entrepreneurs
are relieved of having to be workers, di®usion now proceeds apace. Eventually some ¯rms in
the new sector become bureaucratic, with bears employing bears.
It is also worth noting that at time " = 0, when innovation ¯rst takes place, there is likely to
be a sudden change in the character of ¯rms in the old industry. Were we to introduce a small
amount of uncertainty in these ¯rms, then we would observe Bulls (mostly) employing bears in
this industry prior to the arrival of the second technology. When the new technology arrives at
" = 0, all the Bulls switch to the new sector. This forces more bears to take on ownership roles
in the original sector, so these ¯rms switch from corporate to bureaucratic. In this sense, then,
the innovation process cannot be viewed as the di®usion of ¯rms from one sector to another.
Crucially, innovation involves the break-up of existing ¯rms and the re-constitution of new
ones. If ® is near 1
2, then prior to " = 0, almost all ¯rms have optimistic objective functions;
but at " = 0, less then half do.
6 Concluding Remarks
The objective of this paper is to exhibit a simple framework that embodies the notion of
entrepreneurial innovation, motivated by the recognition that many important innovations have
been initiated by individuals, not ¯rms. Both Gates and Ford, as individuals, held optimistic
beliefs about their respective industries, and built ¯rms to pursue their vision. To talk of
Microsoft moving into the software market, or Ford moving into the motor vehicle market is
meaningless. Yet, this is exactly how the formal economic models treat innovation { as a
`hard-headed' sideways shift by an existing ¯rm into a new and uncertain industry.
Where uncertainty predominates, and there are limitations on the ability of the entrepreneur
to shield workers from this uncertainty, ¯rms' objectives ought to be treated as endogenous. The
¯rm captures more than simply a production technology: it is also a mechanism for resolving
di®erence in attitudes to uncertainty. When an industry is very new and uncertainty is high,
both workers and owners share the same uncertainty attitude. As uncertainty is resolved, there
are gains from trading across di®erences in attitude to uncertainty. Therefore, the nature of
the ¯rm is shown to change with the maturation of the industry. It is this change in the nature
of the ¯rm in the face of resolving uncertainty that creates the S-shaped di®usion curve in our
model.
The PC industry is an excellent example of this process of di®usion and maturation. The
early innovators were optimistic entrepreneurs who worked in small partnerships. In the late
seventies, the large established IBM eventually recognized the potential in the PC and devel-
oped the IBM acorn. This computer was launched in 1981. IBM predicted that it would sell
half a million by 1984. It sold 2 million!
24A Properties of the correspondence »
To complete the proof of Theorem 3.1 it is su±cient to show that the correspondence » is upper
hemi-continuous (u.h.c.), and has non-empty, compact and convex values. It will then follow
by Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem that » has a ¯xed point.
In the course of the arguments, it will be necessary to consider limits of sequences of
allocation functions. Although such functions are points in an in¯nite-dimensional space, the
topological arguments are simpli¯ed by observing that only ¯nitely many properties of these
functions are relevant to the analysis.
Given any allocation function Á, de¯ne the following 4I (Lebesgue) measurable sets:
EB
i (Á) = Á¡1(i) \ [0; ®) i = 1;2;:::;2I
Eb
i(Á) = Á¡1(i) \ [®; 1] i = 1;2;:::;2I
These sets identify the agents of each type assigned to each of the 2I occupations by Á. For
our purposes, the relevant features of Á are simply the Lebesgue measures of these sets. In
particular, we need to know whether or not Á is consistent with some given (w; ±); and the
implied total densities of agents in each occupation. We shall therefore associate with each Á
a ¯nite vector t(Á) which will summarize these properties.
Each t(Á) will be a vector in
T =
©
t 2 [0; 1]4I+1 ¯ ¯ 0 = t1 · t2 · ¢¢¢ · t2I+1 = ® · t2I+2 · ¢¢¢ · t4I+1 = 1
ª









8i · 2I + 1
and








8i 2 f2I +2;2I + 3;:::;4I + 1g












= ^ t2I+i+1 ¡ ^ t2I+i
Conversely, given any t 2 T , we may construct an allocation function Á[t] as follows:




j 2 [ti; ti+1); or
j 2 [ti¤; ti¤+1] and i = i¤ ¡ 2I; or
j 2 (tk; tk+1] and i = k ¡2I > i¤ ¡ 2I






















Let us now return to our consideration of the properties of ». Firstly, it is obvious that:
25Lemma A.1 »(w; ±; x) 6= ; for every (w; ±; x) 2 D.
We next show:
Lemma A.2 »(w; ±; x) is compact for every (w; ±; x) 2 D.




~ w ¢ projIx
)
and fproj¡I xg are clearly closed; so we need only consider X(w; ±).
Let fxng
1
n=1 be a sequence in X(w; ±) with limit x. Then
©
zn ´ C¡1xnª1
n=1 is a sequence
in Z(w; ±) with limit z = C¡1x. Associated with each zn will be an allocation function









Consider the sequence ft(Án)g
1
n=1 in T . Since T is clearly compact, this has a convergent
subsequence with limit t 2 T . If we can show that











then the lemma is proved.
Suppose that (15) does not hold. Then, there must exist some k 2 fB; bg and some i 2 O









Consider the case k = B (the argument is similar if k = b). Then for some














for su±ciently large n along the subsequence de¯ning t. But this contradicts the fact that
Án 2 ©(w; ±) for all n. Hence, (15) must hold.











































and (16) follows. 2
26Lemma A.3 »(w; ±; x) is convex for every (w; ±; x) 2 D.
Proof. Again, the sets (
arg max
~ w2[0;W]I
~ w ¢ projIx
)
and fproj¡I xg are obviously convex. Let ^ x; ~ x 2 X(w; ±) and consider
x = ¸^ x + (1 ¡ ¸)~ x
for some ¸ 2 (0; 1).
De¯ne ^ z = C¡1^ x, ~ z = C¡1~ x, and
z = C¡1x = ¸^ z + (1 ¡ ¸)~ z















Now observe that T is a convex set, and hence consider the t 2 T de¯ned as
t = ¸^ t + (1 ¡ ¸)~ t






= ti+1 ¡ ti







= t2I+i+1 ¡ t2I+i
= ¸(^ t2I+i+1 ¡ ^ t2I+i) + (1 ¡ ¸)(~ t2I+i+1 ¡ ~ t2I+i)






= (ti+1 ¡ ti) + (t2I+i+1 ¡ t2I+i)
= ¸
¡










i (Á[^ t]) [ Eb
i(Á[^ t])
i
+ (1 ¡ ¸)Leb
h
EB
i (Á[~ t]) [ Eb
i(Á[~ t])
i
= ¸^ zi + (1 ¡ ¸)~ zi
Thence z 2 Z(w; ±) and the proof is complete. 2
27Lemma A.4 » is u.h.c.
Proof. Since » is the Cartesian product of three compact-valued correspondences (Lemma
A.2), it su±ces by Proposition 11.25 of Border (1985) to prove upper hemi-continuity for each
of the three component correspondences. The second component correspondence is trivially
u.h.c., and the ¯rst is u.h.c. by standard arguments, so let us consider the third component of
».
X(w; ±) will be u.h.c. if and only if (Border (1985, Proposition 11.11)), for every sequence
f(w; ±)ng
1




xn 2 X ((w; ±)n) 8n
there is a convergent subsequence of fxng
1
n=1 with limit in X(w; ±).
Let f(w; ±)ng
1
n=1, (w; ±), and fxng
1
n=1 satisfy the conditions of the preceding paragraph.









has a convergent subsequence with limit t 2 T .
We claim that Á[t] 2 ©(w; ±). To see this, observe that the correspondences BRE;B and
BRE;b are clearly upper hemi-continuous by the continuity of each type's objective function in
(w; ±). In particular, the Choquet integral is continuous, as is clear from equation (1). There-
fore, if 1 · i · 2I and i 62 BRE;B(w; ±), then it must also be the case that i 62 BRE;B(wn; ±n)
for all su±ciently large n. Hence, we cannot have ti+1 > ti. Analogous conclusions hold for
2I + 1 · i · 4I and (i ¡ 2I) 62 BRE;b(w; ±). So
Á[t] 2 ©(w; ±)
as claimed.























This completes the proof. 2
28A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.2
The following Lemma is useful as preliminary result.
Lemma A.5 Suppose economy E is such that the information correspondence ¡ induces upper
and lower probabilities v and v having the following property:
8E 2 P¤(£) ´ P(£) n f;g v(E) > 0 ) v(E) > 0
Then, any equilibrium of E is innovation-proof.
Proof: Suppose that (w; ±; Á) is an equilibrium of E. Suppose further that there exists an
industry i with ±i = 0, such that a wage ^ wi ¸ 0 and agents k;k0 2 [0; 1], k 6= k0, may be found
satisfying
Evk [Ri(µ; ±) : ¡ : minf^ wi; Ri(µ; ±)g] ¸ yE;¯k(w; ±)
and
Evk0 [minf^ wi; Ri(µ; ±)g] ¸ yE;¯k0(w; ±)
with at least one strict inequality.
Wage rate b wi must be di®erent from wi since otherwise (w; ±; Á) would not have been an
equilibrium in the ¯rst place. Suppose that ^ wi > wi. In this case, we claim that agent k cannot
be strictly better o® after the re-allocation. This is because occupation 2i ¡1 was weakly less
desirable to agent k than k's occupation under Á when ¯rm owners in industry i had to pay
wage wi. Therefore, owning a ¯rm in industry i and paying the strictly higher wage ^ wi cannot
make k strictly better o® than in the original equilibrium. Therefore
yE;¯k(w; ±) = Evk [Ri(µ; ±) ¡ minf^ wi; Ri(µ; ±)g]
= Evk [Ri(µ; ±) ¡ minfwi; Ri(µ; ±)g] (21)
Since
Ri(µ; ±) ¡ minfc; Ri(µ; ±)g
and
minfc; Ri(µ; ±)g
are comonotonic in µ for any c 2 R+, we may conclude that ([?])
Evk [Ri(µ; ±)] = Evk [Ri(µ; ±) ¡ minfc; Ri(µ; ±)g] + Evk [minfc; Ri(µ; ±)g]
) Evk [Ri(µ; ±) ¡ minfc; Ri(µ; ±)g] = Evk [Ri(µ; ±)] ¡ Evk [minfc; Ri(µ; ±)g]
for any c 2 R+. Therefore, (21) implies
Evk [minf^ wi; Ri(µ; ±)g] = Evk [minfwi; Ri(µ; ±)g]
which in turn implies
vk (fµ 2 £ j Ri(µ; ±) > wig) = 0 (22)
29Because k0 must be strictly better o® under the reallocation, we have
Evk0 [minfwi; Ri(µ; ±)g] · yE;¯k0(w; ±)
< Evk0 [minf^ wi; Ri(µ; ±)g]
and hence
vk0 (fµ 2 £ j Ri(µ; ±) > wig) > 0 (23)
But (22) and (23) imply that vk = v (i.e. ¯k = b) and vk0 = v (i.e. ¯k0 = B). Thus, we have a
contradiction to the assumption of the lemma.
The case ^ wi < wi yields a contradiction by an analogous argument. 2
Corollary A.1 Suppose economy E is such that the information correspondence ¡ induces the
lower probability v whose MÄ obius inverse m satis¯es
m(fµg) > 0 8µ 2 £
Then, any equilibrium of E is innovation-proof.
The assumption on m implies v(E) > 0 for all E 2 P¤(£) and the result follows from
Lemma 4.1. 2
We are now ready to prove that under Assumptions 1{3, every economy E possesses an
innovation-proof equilibrium.26
Proof of Theorem 3.2
Let v and v denote the upper and lower probabilities induced by ¡. For the purposes of the
present argument it is convenient to make the assumption that all \redundant" elements have
been removed from £; that is, all µ such that
v(fµg) = v(fµg) = 0
If m, the MÄ obius inverse of v, satis¯es the condition in Corollary 4.1 we are done. Suppose
not; that is, m(fµg) = 0 for some µ 2 £.





f : P(£) ! [0; 1]








Each f 2 M is the MÄ obius inverse of some lower probability on (£; P(£)); conversely, each
lower probability on (£; P(£)) has a MÄ obius inverse in M (see Shafer (1976)). We may identify
M with the unit simplex ¢jP¤(£)j¡1. In particular, M is compact and convex.
Choose some ~ ¼ 2 ri[core(v)]. Then, ~ ¼(E) = v(E) if and only if v(E) = v(E), and ~ ¼(E) >
v(E) otherwise. In particular, letting ~ m 2 M denote the MÄ obius inverse of ~ ¼, we must have
~ m(fµg) > 0 for every µ 2 £ by our non-redundancy assumption.
26Some of the notation used in the following proof is de¯ned in Appendix A.













n=1 in M clearly converges to m and satis¯es mn(fµg) > 0 for every µ 2 £.
If fvng
1
n=1 is the associated sequence of lower probabilities, then vn ! v as n ! 1, and for
each n
vn(E) ¸ v(E) 8E µ £
>From vn we may construct the associated upper probability vn as follows (see Dempster
(1967)):
vn(E) = 1 ¡vn(Ec) 8E 2 P(£)
For each n, de¯ne En as the economy with identical ® and revenue functions to E, but in
which Bulls evaluate their employment options using the capacity vn, and bears evaluate their
options using the capacity vn. For the purposes of the following argument it is unnecessary
to de¯ne a sequence of information correspondences generating these beliefs. By Corollary
4.1, each En has an innovation-proof equilibrium (wn; ±n; Án). Let (w; ±; t) denote the limit
of a convergent subsequence of f(wn; ±n; t(Án))g
1
n=1 (retaining n as index of the convergent










[t] (2i ¡ 1)
i































similarly. So Á[t] clears all labor markets and generates industry density vector ±.
To complete the proof it su±ces to show that Á[t] 2 ©(w; ±), and that (w; ±; Á[t]) is
innovation-proof. Agents of type ¯ 2 fB; bg have objective functions which are continuous in
(wn; ±n; vn
¯), where vn
¯ denotes type ¯'s belief capacity (recall (1) and Assumption 3). Hence
8¯ 2 fB; bg limsup
n!1
BREn;¯(wn; ±n) µ BRE;¯(w; ±)
If ti+1¡ti > 0 for some i 62 BRE;B(w; ±), then tn
i+1¡tn
i > 0 must also hold for su±ciently large
n. Furthermore, if t2I+i+1 ¡t2I+i > 0 for some i 62 BRE;b(w; ±), then again tn
2I+i+1 ¡tn
2I+i > 0
must also hold for su±ciently large n. In each case we have a contradiction to Án 2 ©(wn; ±n).





is not innovation-proof. That is, there exist agents k and k0, an
industry i with ±i = 0, and a wage ^ wi such that if k owns a ¯rm in industry i and employs k0
31as a worker at ^ wi, both do as well as under the candidate equilibrium, and at least one of them
does strictly better. Suppose agent k does strictly better (the argument is similar if we choose
k0 instead). Then
Evk [Ri(µ; ±) ¡ minf^ wi; Ri(µ; ±)g] > yE;¯k(w;±) (24)
where ¯k and vk are k's type and belief capacity respectively. Clearly, it must be the case that
wi > ^ wi. Furthermore, (7) and the fact that
vn
k0(E) > 0 8E 2 P¤(£)
imply the existence of some ´ > 0 such that, for every n,
Evn
k0 [minfc; Ri(µ; ±)g]
is strictly increasing in c when c 2 [^ wi; ^ wi + ´]. On the other hand, since
Evk0 [minf^ wi; Ri(µ; ±)g] ¸ yE;¯k0(w;±) ¸ Evk0 [minfwi; Ri(µ; ±)g]
we see that
Evk0 [minfc; Ri(µ; ±)g] = yE;¯k0(w;±) 8c 2 [^ wi; wi]
In particular, we must have vk0 ´ v and
m(B) = 0 8B µ fµ 2 £ j Ri(µ; ±) > ^ wig 6= ;
Recalling that vn ¸ v, we deduce
Evn
k0 [minf^ wi; Ri(µ; ±)g] ¸ Evk0 [minf^ wi; Ri(µ; ±)g]
for each n. Letting ~ wi 2 (^ wi; ^ wi + ´), we therefore have
Evn
k0 [minf~ wi; Ri(µ; ±)g] ¡ yE;¯k0(w;±) > Evk0 [minf~ wi; Ri(µ; ±)g] ¡ yE;¯k0(w;±)
for all n. Hence
Evn
k0 [minf~ wi; Ri(µ; ±n)g] ¡ yEn;¯k0(wn;±n) ¸ Evk0 [minf~ wi; Ri(µ; ±)g] ¡ yE;¯k0(w;±)
for all su±ciently large n, using the continuity of the functions on the left-hand side of the
inequality. Therefore, for all large n,
Evn
k0 [minfwn
i ; Ri(µ; ±n)g] ¡ yEn;¯k0(wn;±n) > Evk0 [minf~ wi; Ri(µ; ±)g] ¡ yE;¯k0(w;±)
since Evn
k0 [minfc; Ri(µ; ±n)g] is strictly increasing in c at c = ~ wi when n is su±ciently large.
But observe that the right-hand side of this inequality is equal to zero, so
Evn
k0 [minfwn
i ; Ri(µ; ±n)g] > yEn;¯k0(wn;±n)
which is a contradiction. This completes the proof. 2
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